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1.
INTRODUCTION: UNEP, REGIONAL SEAS AND
CARTAGENA CONVENTION
In June 1972 the UN Conference on the Human Environment, in Stockholm, Sweden
created the United Nations Environment Programme. Its task was to oversee all matters
dealing with the environment addressed by the UN.1 Among its responsibilities and
successes is the Regional Seas Programme (hereinafter RSP).2 The RSP has 13
agreements covering over 140 countries.3

The RSP’s mandate, is to coordinate nations bordering on common seas on matters
related to the prevention of environmental degradation of coastal regions, including
inland waters, coastal waters and the open sea.4 It operates through a series of periodic
meetings of high-level officials who develop an Action Plan.5 Simply put, “When the
same problem crops up in every country, even if only on a local scale, then it becomes a
common problem. All the countries of the region benefit by looking for a common
solution.”6 Essentially RSP tries to coordinate and convert those concerns into regional
action plans.7

1

United Nations Environment Programme, “About UNEP”
http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentID=43&ArticleID=3301 .
2
For an uptodate review of the entire program including reports from each of the Programmes, see Global
Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities, document
“Regional Seas: Strategies for Sustainable Development.” http://www.gpa.unep.org/documents/finalrsb.pdf
at Sept 1, 2003.
3
RSP, “History of the Regional Seas Programme” (undated) source
<http://www.unep.ch/seas/main/hhist.html> at June 28, 2003 (hereinafter “History”) no pagination
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Editor interview with S. Keckes “Thin ice over Regional Seas,” (1983) 12 Ambio 1, no pagination,
http://www.unep.ch/seas/Archive/thin.html at July 15 2003.
7
Ivica Trumbic, “Regional Seas Programme of UNEP” United Nations Environment Programme—
Mediterranean Action Plan, Priority Actions Programme Regional Activity Centre.
http://www.unep.ch/seas/Archive/thin.html at July 12 2003 (hereinafter “Trumbic”) no pagination.
References to section headings, s. 4.
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The two most successful8 of the thirteen conventions are the Barcelona Convention,
dealing with the Mediterranean Sea and the Cartagena Convention, dealing with the
Caribbean.9 The later convention was finalized at the RSP meeting in Cartagena de
Indias, Columbia in 1983. Although its proper title is, Convention for the Protection and
Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, it is commonly
known as the Cartagena Convention (hereinafter “Cartagena”).

8

Trumbic, s. 4 and s. 6. Success here appears to mean one or both of: countries cooperating and having a
significant positive effect on the environment. As Trumbic notes: “The results and achievements have been
mixed, and a thorough evaluation of its success still remains to be done.” Jorge Illueca, current director of
UNEP Division of Environmental Conventions appears more optimistic. He wrote: “These regional
agreements have been extraordinarily effective in engaging governments in protecting the environment.”
in J.Illueca, “A Regional Seas renaissance.” (1999) 1 Synergies 2
http://www.unep.ch/conventions/synergies/synergiesmag.htm at July 12, 2003. Von Moltke observes:
“The Regional Seas Programme has put in place a series of agreements to protect marine resources. None
of these agreements has been effective in the sense that the trend of increasing pollution of the marine
environment… has been reversed.” K. von Moltke, “Why UNEP Matters” Green Globe Yearbook (1996) p.
58. Interestingly, legal scholar E. Brown Weiss notes the near total lack of investigation on the efficacy of
international legal agreements in terms of implementation and compliance. “Symposium: International
Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order” (March 1993) 81
Geo. LJ 695-697.
9
Trumbic, s. 4.
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(Source: Global Marine Oil Pollution Gateway website)

2. CARTAGENA CONVENTION: AN ANALYSIS
Cartagena along with its three protocols, dealing with oil spills,10 protected areas,11 and
land based pollution,12 respectively, is one of the most comprehensive RSPs. In addition
as of February 2, 2002 Cartagena was also coordinated with the Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission for the Caribbean of UNESCO by way of a Memorandum
of Cooperation.13 Cartagena is not a stand alone agreement or designed to supersede
extent agreements. Partly it is designed to supplement other multilateral treaties in place
such as MARPOL 73/78 and the Convention on Biological Diversity and to complement
UNCLOS.

Cartagena is made up of thirty articles dealing with general objectives and responsibilities
and a separate Annex of ten articles dealing with dispute resolution. The preamble
indicates the parties’ recognition of their responsibilities for the region’s important and
valuable marine environment, and their need to coordinate their efforts in order to
preserve the environment in the development process. The parties specifically identify
the need to secure wider acceptance of environmental agreements already in place and
note that there are gaps in those agreements that need to be addressed. Cartagena is

10

A Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Oil Spills (CEPPOL) in the Wider Caribbean Region,
March 24, 1983. entered into force simultaneously with the Convention on 11 October 1986
http://www.cep.unep.org/law/cartstatus.html at July 2, 2003.
11
A Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW) in the Wider Caribbean Region
January 18, 2000 entered into force on June 18, 2000. http://www.cep.unep.org/law/cartstatus.html at July
2, 2003.
12
A Protocol on Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities (LBSMP) October 6, 1999 in
Aruba. Has not yet entered into force http://www.cep.unep.org/law/cartstatus.html at July 2, 2003.
13
An Overview of Cartagena Convention, http://www.unep.ch/seas/main/hoverv.html at July 2, 2003.
.
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focused on those waters making up the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico and extends to
the limits of the EEZ of the parties.

Article 1 identifies the area to be addressed—“the wider Caribbean region” (hereinafter
WCR)—and notes that the area does not include internal waters of the countries. Article
2 deals with definitions. It identifies the WCR as including the Gulf of Mexico, the
Caribbean Sea, and those adjacent areas of the Atlantic Ocean, south of 30 degrees
latitude north and within 200 nautical miles of the Atlantic coasts of signatories to
Cartagena.

Article 3, entitled “General Provisions”, sets out the terms governing relationships
between Cartagena and other obligations taken on by the parties. Specifically, it notes
that Cartagena shall not be deemed to modify any of those obligations, nor prejudice
claims concerning matters of maritime jurisdiction. It anticipates and encourages further
conventions to protect the environment.

Article 4 sets out the general obligations pursuant to Cartagena of the signatories. They
are to:
individually or jointly, take all appropriate measures in conformity with
international law… to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the Convention
area… to ensure sound environmental management, using… best practicable
means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities.

4

In fulfilling these objectives, they are not to damage the marine environment outside of
the WCR. The parties are obligated to cooperate in implementing Cartagena and in
assisting one another in the fulfillment of their duties.

Cartagena then addresses more specific issues. Article 5 requires the parties to:
take all appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
Convention area caused by discharges from ships, and for this purpose, to ensure
the effective implementation of the applicable international rules and standards
established by the competent international organization.
Articles 6, 7, 8, and 9 reiterate the language of Article 5 with respect to dumping, landbased sources of marine pollution, sea-bed activities, and airborne pollution respectively.
Article 10, which deals with specially protected areas, is forward looking both in
anticipating further conventions or protocols to establish protected areas, and in its
precautionary principle14 and “ecosystem” approach.15 It requires “all appropriate
measures to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems, as well as the habitat of
depleted, threatened or endangered species.”

Article 11 sets out some specific duties. In the event of an emergency, all parties
requested are required to respond to the emergency, regardless of cause. It requires the
parties individually and jointly to prepare “contingency plans.” Further, it requires the
parties to notify other states likely to be affected by pollution whenever the notifying
party becomes aware of either pollution or a threat of pollution. Finally, it requires
parties to inform each other and appropriate international bodies of remedial action taken.

14

Weiss Brown, above n 7, 690.
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Article 12 requires parties to develop technical standards and the corollary legislation to
protect the environment in “major development projects.” It requires the parties to a
major development to consult with RSP and through it, with other parties affected by the
major development. This cooperation requirement is interesting in that the development
could be on land, and could be seen by some parties as an infringement of sovereignty.

Article 13 extends the cooperation, in non-mandatory language, to sharing scientific
information relating to Cartagena and the WCR. It also calls for coordinating joint
research projects and the linking of research centers, and in mandatory language, for
participating in international arrangements for research and monitoring. Article 14
requires the parties to cooperate in the development of law to address liability and
compensation in the event of pollution damage.

Article 15 deals with the development of institutions to administer Cartagena while
designating UNEP as the secretariat for Cartagena. Article 16 sets out a scheme of biannual meetings with contingency meetings to be called as necessary, and what is to be
addressed at those meetings.

Article 17 addresses additional protocols, and Article 18 deals with Amendments to
Cartagena and its protocols. It is an open procedure permitting any party to propose
amendments and sets out the procedure in general terms. Annexes and their amendments
are dealt with in Article 19, the terms of which are essentially the same as those for
Amendments to Cartagena and protocols set out in the previous article. Article 20
15

Ibid, 690.
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addresses further procedural matters and sets out the parties’ responsibility to identify
their individual, specific financial responsibilities under Cartagena.

Article 21 permits other regional economic bodies to vote on behalf of all parties where
those parties do not vote, in specific areas of competence. Article 22 provides the
specifics of how and when the information required to be transferred pursuant to
Cartagena be done—at the times and in the manner as the parties determine. Essentially,
it draws attention to the need to formalize the information transfer.

Article 23 deals with dispute settlement concerning issues of interpretation of Cartagena.
It specifically and repeatedly requires the parties to use “peaceful means” to resolve
disputes, and permits any party unilaterally to submit the dispute for arbitration (pursuant
to the terms of the Arbitration Annex to Cartagena).

Article 24 prohibits parties from becoming signatories to Cartagena unless they too
become signatories to the Protocol. This provision seems to address the weakness of
previous international agreements, which while committing parties to the agreement, fail
to place immediate, positive duties to act.16

Articles 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 deal with the technical mechanisms of signatures,
ratification, accession, entry into force, denunciation, and depository respectively.
Cartagena was opened for signature on March 21, 1983 in Cartagena de Indias,

7

Columbia. The Columbian government is the depository. It permits non-signatories to
become parties to Cartagena on approval of at least three-fourths of the parties. It further
permits non-state parties to be members, and in particular, regional economic
organizations to become members provided they meet certain conditions. Cartagena and
the Protocol on Oil Spills was to come into force thirty days after the ninth instrument of
ratification, acceptance or approval had been deposited. This criterion for coming into
force is to apply to all subsequent protocols. Denunciation is permitted only after a
period of two years of coming into force to be effective ninety days after the
denunciation. Denunciation of Cartagena is deemed to extend to the protocols as well,
and denunciation of a protocol is deemed denunciation of Cartagena.

In summary, the main duties created by Cartagena with respect to pollution are: pollution
from ships (Art. 5), dumping (Art. 6), land-based pollution of the marine environment
(Art. 7), sea-bed exploitation (Art. 8), and air-borne pollution (Art. 9). In addition, it
creates obligations concerning the development of specially protected areas (Art. 10), the
development of contingency plans (Art. 11), the development of technical standards and a
consultative process for major developments (Art. 12), sharing of scientific information
(Art. 13), development of appropriate laws and the coordination of law (Art. 14), and
institutional development (Art. 15).

16

Weiss Brown notes all the Regional Seas Agreements have included this feature as a lesson from
previous international agreements. The failure of the efficacy of previous agreements is attributable, in
part, to the failure to include such provisions. Above n 7, 688.
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3. COMPARISON WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTIONS AND REGIONAL SEAS AGREEMENTS
As one of a number of international agreements dealing with this issue, it is worth
considering how Cartagena stands in comparison with these other agreements, both from
an analytical perspective, and from a practical perspective. The value of such a
comparison is that it provides an external hermeneutical tool for understanding
Cartagena. In particular, many of the signatories to Cartagena, 17 are also signatories to
such international agreements as MARPOL 73/78 and UNCLOS.18 In this section,
attention will be turned to examine the interaction between Cartagena and MARPOL
73/78.

MARPOL 73/78

17

As noted by various scholars, the USA has followed its own scheme making coordination with
international frameworks difficult. See for example, comments on the Oil Pollution Act, 1990 and
comments by M. White , “Development of the International Conventions” sec. 3.3.6, Ch. 3 in Marine
Pollution Laws of the Australian Region, (1994). In addition, its environmental law system tends to be
inward focused. USA monitors and regulates its own activities affecting the Gulf of Mexico, as is evident
from the EPA’s website on the area, <http://www.epa.gov/region6/water/ecopro/index.htm> at June 28
2003, and appears to have little cooperation with international agencies such as CEP. Its National Ocean
Service notes various international projects, but none are focused on pollution in the Gulf of Mexico
generally. For that reason, the following analysis will not deal with the USA. The National Environmental
Protection Act mandates cooperation on an international level where it furthers US interests. Title 42,
Chap. 55 Sec. 4332.
18
The 1982 UN Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets as its objective to create: “a legal order for the seas and
oceans which will facilitate… equitable and efficient utilization… [and] the conservation of their living
resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment.” (preamble) UNCLOS
was a significant step in a different direction with respect to environmental law pertaining the global
commons for the world. In particular, UNCLOS precludes the view of the oceans and seas as an open
dumping grounds for anyone choosing to do so. Further, it shifted the balance between the competing
navigational interests of flag states and the environmental interests of coastal states. Finally, it took a
proactive approach to the prevention of marine environmental pollution instead of an after the fact
apportionment of liability approach. P.W. Birnie and A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment,
2nd ed (2002). (in course materials page numbers cut off.) UNCLOS does not, however, set out specifics of
how these obligations are to be fulfilled, administered or enforced. Those aspects are left to the parties as
they negotiate various conventions, protocols and other instruments to address those specific concerns.
Therefore an analysis of UNCLOS is not particularly relevant and a review of the specific instruments,
Cartagena and MARPOL 73/78 is appropriate.

9

MARPOL 73/78 was initially negotiated in London in 1973 as a successor to OILPOL.
Due to problems with non-ratification of MARPOL 73, it was revised by a second
meeting in London in 1978—MARPOL 78—in which sufficient modifications were
negotiated to obtain the required ratifications needed to come into force.19 MARPOL 73
consists of its preamble and twenty articles and one convention. The preamble
acknowledges the importance of the environment for human survival and the negative
impact of oil on the environment. It sets out the interesting lofty objective of “Desiring
to achieve the complete elimination of intentional pollution of the marine environment by
oil and other harmful substances and the minimization of accidental discharge of such
substances.”20 The parties state their belief that this objective can best be achieved by
rules addressing all pollution and not just oil.

MARPOL works on the basis of certifying ships in terms of safety, and pollution
compliance. It further grants inspection powers, detainment and prosecution powers to
both flag states, port states and coastal states. Article one sets out the parties’
commitment to be bound by the agreement, its protocol and annexes. Article two, which
offers definitions is important for its definitions of substances, discharges and ships. Its
broad definitions of “harmful substance,” which includes anything that harms marine life
or damage to amenities, and “discharge”, which is defined as “any release howsoever
caused… and includes any escape, disposal, spilling, leaking, pumping, emitting or
emptying” are considerably limited by exclusions under 3(b)(i) of dumping under the

19
20

IMO website, conventions, MARPOL 73/78 <http://www.imo.org/home.asp> at July 3 2003.
MARPOL 73/78 preamble.
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dumping convention, and (ii) of sea-bed mineral resource exploitation.21 “Ships” include
any type of human made thing for use on, in or underwater, fixed or free. There is no
limit to the size of the thing that MARPOL 73 is to apply.

Article three states MARPOL 73 is to apply to all vessels flying the flag of a party or
operating under the authority of a party. It specifies that MARPOL 73 is not designed to
derogate from sovereign rights for exploration or exploitation of resources, and excludes
all state ships in non-commercial governmental service.

Article four deals states that violations may be dealt with either under the law of the
offended Party to MARPOL 73, or may be brought by the Administration of the ship.
Article five begins with MARPOL 73’s certificates regime. It requires all ships under the
administration of a Party to have a certificate declaring the state of the ship. Parties are
permitted to inspect ships for the purpose of determining whether the certificate is
aboard, and in the event that there is considerable discrepancy between the certificate and
the condition of the vessel, Parties are permitted to detain vessels until repaired, or
authorize their departure only to sail to the nearest appropriate repair yard. MARPOL 73
also permits a party to deny entry to a vessel of another signatory for such breaches;
however, in such instances diplomatic notification must be given immediately.

Article six sets out the responsibilities of cooperation among the parties. They are to be
using “all appropriate measures of detection and environmental monitoring, adequate

21

3(b)(iii) also excludes discharges for scientific purposes, which do not appear to be significant as they do
not appear to be used as a pretext for dumping.
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procedures for reporting and accumulation of evidence.” It furthers the inspection rights
of parties to inspection for purposes determining whether ships have discharged in
violation. In the event of such a discharge, the investigating party is required to forward
the evidence to the administrator which in turn is obligated to take proceedings, provided
the evidence is sufficient. It further permits one party to investigate a ship on the request
of a second party.

Article seven addresses the reasonable commercial concern that ships shall not be
“unduly detained or delayed” and that in the event of such detention or delay,
compensation shall be paid “for any loss or damage suffered.” Article eight addresses the
need for communicating information by mandating that the parties set up an office or
agency to deal with matters of MARPOL 73 and inform the IMO and other parties about
the office or agency.

Article nine deals with the interaction of MARPOL 73 with other conventions and
specifically that it does not affect legal positions parties may take under UNCLOS, nor
jurisdictional rights of coastal or flag states pursuant to international law. Article ten
addresses dispute settlement by requiring parties to submit such disputes to arbitration
pursuant to Protocol II to MARPOL 73. Article eleven requires the parties to
communicate legislation dealing with MARPOL, NGO’s dealing with MARPOL 73
related matters, and samples of certificates, a list and details of reception facilities,
reports which provide evidence of the application of MARPOL 73, and annual statistical
reports to the IMO.

12

Article twelve requires parties to investigate casualties to ships where the casualty has
resulted in a “major deleterious effect upon the marine environment” and to report it to
the IMO. Article thirteen deals with the signatory and ratification process. Article
fourteen addresses the annexes. Annexes I and II dealing with oil and noxious liquid
substances were mandatory at the time of signing. The additional annexes, III, IV, and V
dealing respectively with harmful packaged substances, sewage and garbage, are
optional.

Articles 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 deal with entry into force provisions, amending
procedures, technical cooperation, denunciation confirming the IMO as the depository
and finally, and languages and official translations, respectively. MARPOL 78 Article
one delays the coming into force of Annex II for three years. The second article restricts
and places identification responsibilities for the NGO’s involved. These are the two
substantive changes MARPOL 78 adds to MARPOL 73.

4. ANALYTICAL COMPARISON
Cartagena and MARPOL, while ostensibly dealing with the same matter, marine
environmental pollution, are very different treaties. Aside from the obvious difference in
scope as between a regional and an international agreement, and the focus of a general
environmental treaty versus a treaty focused on ship source pollution, the treaties differ
substantially with respect to their design, structure, implementation frameworks and

13

objectives. Those particular differences and consequential efficacy will be examined in
this section.

Cartagena is a very broadly drafted treaty, reflecting an effort to include as many actual
and potential environmental concerns as possible. This approach permits the details to be
negotiated separately in protocols and annexes. Doing so allows the parties to get a basic
framework into place more easily and start on the process of moving toward the objective
with less obstacles.

By way of contrast, MARPOL is very specific. Whereas Cartagena offers the general
obligation of “all appropriate measures,… to prevent, reduce and control pollution”,
MARPOL 73/78 in its definitions identifies the issues to be addressed—“discharges” of
“harmful substances.”22 Further, MARPOL grants more specific rights directly to parties
in terms of inspections and enforcement than does Cartagena. Of course, Cartagena goes
well beyond ships and so clearly such rights which could over-ride sovereignty claims
could not be granted easily.

In terms of structure, in addition to the specifics noted in the detailed analysis above it
can be noted that the overall structure of MARPOL 73/78 is focused on ocean activities.
By way of contrast, Cartagena is structured with a focus on member rights and
obligations. MARPOL 73/78 is deposited and monitored by a strong, well recognized,
international body, the IMO. Cartagena is administered by a relatively young, smaller,
poorly funded local office of UNEP located in Kingston, Jamaica.

14

Specifically focusing on Cartagena’s ship source marine pollution provisions, it may be
characterized as exceedingly general. Again, the language is
shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
Convention area caused by discharges from ships and, for this purpose, to ensure
the effective implementation to the applicable international rules and standards
established by the competent international organization.23

There are at least three ways to interpret this Article. It could be read as referring to
parties’ obligation to ensure compliance with international agreements concerning shipsourced pollution. Or, it could be read as indicating an obligation to create agreements
concerning ship-based pollution which are in conformity with international law, or it
could be read as reaffirming an obligation for the parties themselves to comply with
obligations placed on them by international law.

By way of contrast, MARPOL 73/78 includes in its Protocol a series of specific
regulations detailing not only the size and types of ships it applies to, but also the
permitted amounts of discharges and the specific duties placed on parties and mariners
and others in the event of discharges. One result of such specificity is that MARPOL
´73/78´s successes and failures are more easily measured.

Although in one sense, it may not be fair, let alone feasible to make a comparison
between the agreements, given their different focuses and scopes; in the areas in which

22
23

See Appendix B.
Art. 5
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they overlap, there is some, if not sufficient, basis for comparison. This comparison
should provide not only some idea of the efficacy of various approaches, but also the
efficacy of international instruments of environmental law, at least in the Caribbean
region.

5. “ON THE GROUND” RESULTS ANALYSIS
5.1 MARPOL: SUCCESS?
MARPOL 73/78 is generally considered a great success. The oil industry points to the
reduced tanker discharges. Indeed, there has been success in terms of reducing oil tanker
disasters. As observed by INTERTANKO, the oil tanker owners group, “The average
number of large spills per year during the 1990s was about a third of that witnessed
during the 1970’s.”24 These figures, though comforting they may be, leave room for
question on MARPOL success in other areas.

In Gerard Peet´s effort to evaluate the success or failure of MARPOL 73/78 he observes
that there are two criteria in determining success—a reduction of the total amount of oil
entering the marine environment from accident or operation of ships, and second,
determining whether national governments have effectively implemented international
agreements.25 The basis for answering the first question is monitoring statistics. As Peet
observes, however, “[there are] only a few areas in the world where adequate efforts are
24

ITOPF, “Historical Data” Statistics, at p. 2, http://www.itopf.com/stats.html, at July 5, 2003.
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made to detect… discharges.”26 Its lack of monitoring state compliance and its lack of
mechanism for dealing with non-complying states.27

He notes, for example, that according to GESAMP statistics, the North Sea appears to
have a very high level of discharges, but then notes than extensive Dutch efforts to
monitor oil in the North Sea.28 By way of contrast, from the reported statistics, one
would believe there is hardly any oil being discharged into the seas south of the equator.
He offers: “It is more likely that the numbers of detected discharges are an indication of
the effort made to detect discharges”29 than a reflection of actual discharges. Peet finds
that within a single publication, GESAMP’s 1993 report, that two significantly different
estimates of oil entering the marine environment are offered. The one estimate is 2.3
million tons, the other is 7.3 million tons. From this he concludes “The various estimates
are too far apart…. The only valid conclusion seems to be that we do not really know
how much oil enters the marine environment, due to a lack of reliable data.”30
A failure to declare MARPOL 73/78 a success in reducing oil entering into the marine
environment, however, is not a declaration that it has failed to have a positive impact in
reducing ship based discharges.

The second measurable determinant of MARPOL 73/78 success, national compliance
with international obligations, does not seem to fare much better. To arrive at this
25

G. Peet “International Co-operation to Prevent Oil Spills at Sea: Not Quite the Success It should Be.” In
H. Ole and G. Parmann (eds) Green Globe Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and
Development (1994) p 41-54.
26
Ibid. p. 44.
27
Birnie above n. 14.
28
Ibid, p. 44.
29
Ibid.
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conclusion, Peet examines ratifying countries’ compliance with MARPOL 73/78’s
clauses requiring measurable action. These are: Art. 11(e) and (f) the reporting
requirements, Art 6(1) use of all appropriate measures to detect, Art 4(1), (2), (3), and (4)
mandatory enforcement measures, and Annex I, Reg. 12(1) concerning port reception
facilities. We will turn briefly to analyze country compliance with the obligations
contained in each of these articles.

With respect to Art.11´s reporting requirements, Peet observes that only the Australians
have submitted every annual report as required by the convention, and that another seven
have submitted all but one. He goes on to note, however, that thirty countries party to
MARPOL 73/78 have never submitted a single report.31 It is hard to imagine, says Peet,
how a country that fails such a relatively simple administrative task is directing attention
to the more difficult task of fulfilling other obligations under the convention.32

Article 6(1) deals with detection and monitoring duties. In the previously mentioned
study, when The Netherlands devoted additional resources to detection, significantly
more discharges were detected creating an impression that the North Sea was exception
in the amount of oil and waste being discharged into the ocean. Given these obviusly
skewed discharge statistics, showing high levels when monitoring detection measures are
being implemented it can hardly be argued that countries are fulfilling their MARPOL
73/78 obligations.33

30

Ibid, 43.
Ibid.
32
Ibid, 47.
33
Ibid, 48.
31
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As to the efficacy of the prosecutions mandated pursuant to Article 4, the situation is
even more dismal. After his examination and analysis of detection, detentions and
prosecutions, Peet concludes in agreement with the conclusion of another study by the
Werkgroep Noordzee:34
There was little chance that ships would be detected… [and if detected] little
chance that they would be brought to justice… [and if convicted] chances were
small penalties would be given… [and if given would] definitely not [be]
adequate in severity to discourage MARPOL 73/78 violations.35

Finally, as to the obligation to provide port reception facilities created by Annex I, Reg.
12, there seems to be a very low level of compliance. A 1986 study found the lack of
port reception facilities to be a serious complaint by shipmasters hampering their ability
to comply with MARPOL 73/78 requirements36 and as noted in their 2002 work, Birnie
and Boyle write: “the persistence of operational discharges does indicate a continuing
inadequacy in the provision of port reception facilities, a long-standing problem despite
the obligation to provide them placed on port states by the MARPOL Convention.”37

Turning our focus back to the WCR sheds further light on MARPOL 73/78´s success.
MARPOL 73/78 in the WCR does not seem to have reached even a basic level of
success. In his 1996 study of the state of marine law in the Caribbean region, Prof.
Anderson observes, that a strict application of even MARPOL 73/78’s predecessor,
34

(Trans. “North Sea Workgroup”) M. J. Stoop Olieverontreiniging door schepen op de Noordzee over de
periode 1982-1987, opsporing en vervoging, cited in Peet, above n 21, 54, n 10. In other words, from a
shipmaster’s perspective there appears to be minimal legal incentive to comply with MARPOL 73/78.
Such compliance would be more as a result of the shipmaster’s own convictions on matters concerning the
marine environment than legal duties.
35
Above n 21, 50.
36
Ibid 50-51.
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OILPOL, would reduce oil annual discharges from 1,000,000 tons to 16,700 tons.38
Unfortunately, it is simply not being done.

Although pursuant to MARPOL 73/78, the Caribbean was declared an Annex V
(protection from pollution from garbage) special area, the important Annex I (protection
from oil pollution) Special Area designation has not been put into place. The issue is the
previously mentioned costly reception facilities.39 This state of affairs—the failure to
protect from garbage and oil pollution-- is particularly lamentable given on the one hand,
the region’s great biological diversity, beauty and the important economic boost from the
tourism industry dependent on that beauty, and on the other hand, the region’s significant
oil reserves, production and transportation.

Perhaps the only correct conclusion is that of Birnie and Boyle who observed:
“Quantifying MARPOL’s impact is… not straightforward, and the data do not point to
any clear conclusion, except that the operational pollution does appear to have
declined.”40

5.2 CARTAGENA CONVENTION: SUCCESS?

Cartagena’s objectives vis-à-vis pollution are the control and reduction of: pollution from
ships (Art. 5), dumping (Art. 6), land-based pollution of the marine environment (Art. 7),
pollution from sea-bed exploitation (Art. 8), and air-borne pollution (Art. 9). In addition,
37

Ibid.
W. Anderson, The Law of Caribbean Marine Pollution, (1996) 67, n. 104.
39
Ibid, 138.
38
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it creates obligations concerning the development of specially protected areas (Art. 10),
the development of contingency plans (Art. 11), the development of technical standards
and a consultative process for major developments (Art. 12), sharing of scientific
information (Art. 13), development of appropriate laws and the coordination of law (Art.
14), and institutional development (Art. 15).

We will analyse these Cartagena goals making reference as well to the three protocols.
Article 5, dealing with pollution from ships is complementary to MARPOL 73/78 and
relates to discharges of harmful substances. Ships release harmful substances by
operation and by accident. In terms of pollution from operation, they produce harmful
substances in the course of making their journeys. These harmful substances are waste
oil, air pollution, and garbage and sewage.41 To avoid the discharge of these harmful
substances at sea, they must discharge them at ports in port reception facilities. The issue
then becomes one of port reception facilities.42

Port reception facilities in the WCR are either non-existent or inadequate at best. An
IMO/World Bank study found that of 23 site visits to port reception facilities in the
WCR, 10 ports did not permit off-loading of solid wastes and that the13 that permitted
off-loading did not have sufficient facilities to deal with the waste.43 This lack of port

40

Ibid.
Birnie above n 14.
42
This is after one considers such issues as the master’s desire not to pollute and surveillance and
enforcement measures as previously discussed.
43
Environmental Resources Limited, “Port Reception and Disposal Facilities from Garbage in the Wider
Caribbean.” (1991). IMO/World Bank, 287. cited in “Oil and Litter” Global Plan of Action for the
Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities
http://www.cep.unep.org/gpa/oilitter.htm , at July 5, 2003.
41
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reception facilities is noted as a cause of oil pollution in the WCR.44 Further, cruise ships
which generate about 4,400 kg of waste per day,45 place an additional demand for port
reception facilities and are known to dump untreated sewage and hazardous waste
directly into the marine environment of the WCR.46 In addition to increased cruise ship
activity, the Caribbean in increasingly becoming an important area for containerized
shipping.47 This development places further demands the environment from shipping
activities, particularly in light of the inadequate port reception facilities.48

Comprehensive spill statistics for non-tankers are non-existent in the WCR. There is a
serious lack of information about oil contamination by ships in the WCR.49 Given the
lack of monitoring,50 one may conclude that oil discharges by ships are not being tracked,
addressed or discouraged through legal proceedings and accordingly, it is a foregone
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Caribbean Environment Programme, United Nations Environment Programme, CEP Technical Report
No. 33 “Regional Overview of Land-Based Sources of Pollution in the Wider Caribbean Region” (1994)
http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/techreports/tr33en/index.html at July 12 2003.
45
GESAMP “A Sea of Troubles,” Reports and Studies No. 70 at p. 28,
http://gesamp.imo.org/no70/index.htm at July 15, 2003.
46
Ibid, p. 24. GESAMP notes that about one third of the wasted dumped by cruise ships in the Caribbean
is done deliberately. In the recent past, Norwegian Cruise Lines, Carnival Corp. and Royal Caribbean
Cruises all have faced fines ranging from $1 million to $27 million for illegal pollution of the marine
environment. Further these companies have engaged in production of fraudulent documents to cover up
their wrong-doing. In November, 2002 Norwegian was given the smallest fine of $1 million because of its
efforts to report, cooperate and change its operating procedures. M. Adams, “U.S. Keeps Wary Eye On
Cruise Ships For More Pollution” Miami USA TODAY 11 August 2002.
<http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2002/2002-11-08-cruise-dumping.htm> at July 15, 2003. The
court’s decision, however, to accept Norwegian’s position seems somewhat suspect when one considers
Norwegian’s May 2003 action. As the Seattle Times reported: “The 2,400-passenger Norwegian Cruise
Line ship… dumped more than 16,000 gallons of human waste in the Strait of Juan de Fuca last weekend.”
C. Welch, “Dumping of ship's waste widens rift between state, Coast Guard” (Seattle) Seattle Times 8 May
2003 http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/134699148_ship08m.html at 15 July 2003.
Holland America has also received a multi-million dollar fine for sewage discharge. Noted on Navy
Shipyard Clearinghouse website <http://navyseic.dt.navy.mil/oil/oil.htm> 15 July 2003.
47
See for example, CSX’s new port facility being built in the Dominican Republic, noted below n 68.
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CEP Technical Report No. 33 above n 39, 7.
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GESAMP Statement 2001 http://gesamp.imo.org/ at 10 July 2003.
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The Government of Mexico claims to be monitoring the situation, however, any details of such programs
are not available. III Estudios y Actividades, sec. D The marine environmental program is run by the
Mexican navy. http://www.semar.gob.mx/promam.htm at 21 July 2003.
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conclusion that they occur with relative frequency. Such being the case, the
determination of the actual amount of pollution entering the WCR marine environment as
a result of shipping activities is impossible. Accordingly, it is not possible to make any
statements, positive or negative, about the utility of Art.6 of the Cartagena in decreasing
pollution by ships in the Caribbean. One can merely speculate that with the explosion in
shipping and cruise ships in the WCR that the environmental situation is not improving.

Article 7, deals with land-based sources of pollution. A determination of Cartagena’s
utility in reducing land-based pollution can be done by an examination of two sources:
the technical reports concerning contaminants entering the Caribbean, and by reference to
a particular visible land-based use which places heavy demands on the marine
environment—tourism.51

Land-based marine environmental pollution in the WCR has six main sources: sewage,
oil hydrocarbons, sediments, nutrients, pesticides, solid waste and marine debris, and toxic
substances.52 The two leading land-based pollutants of the marine environment—sewage
and oil—will be briefly examined.

By 1993, sewage had been identified as by far the most significant pollutant.53 As noted
in the RSP report, “From the Regional overview, we conclude that the main problems

51

A legal review of duties under the protocol on land-based contaminants will not assist as it is not yet in
force.
52
CEP Technical Report 33 above n 39. While sediments, nutrients, pesticides, solid wastes and toxic
materials are also significant pollutants in the WCR, space precludes their discussion.
53
Ibid 5.
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affecting the Caribbean Sea are domestic sewage and solid waste.”54 The WCR sewage
problem is caused by the large number of people living along the coast, tourism, industry
and ship wastes. Unfortunately, little information concerning sewage treatment along the
non-USA coasts has been available.55 A survey of sewage treatment plants in the WCR
led to the conclusion that there are inadequate numbers of such plants and that
approximately two thirds of those in operation were inadequaly maintained to serve their
function.56 It has been estimated that no more than ten percent of the population in the
WCR is served by sewage treatment.57 Despite knowledge of the problem in the 1980s
the situation appears no different in 2003.58

The WCR is one of the world’s leading oil producing regions.59 As a result, there are
considerable associated activities, including, exploring, drilling, extracting, refining and
transport that take place on land. These activities lead to spillage of oil and hydrocarbons
into natural and human-made systems that empty into the marine environment. Oil
refineries and petrochemical plants in the WCR have been identified as a major source of
marine pollution60 and the oil industry as the largest industrial polluter.61 Further, the
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UNEP: Assessment of Land-based Sources and Activities Affecting the Marine, Coastal and Associated
Freshwater Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region,” UNEP/GPA Co-ordination Office & Caribbean
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Ibid 5.
57
KCM, Inc, CEP Technical Report 40, “Appropriate Technology for Sewage Pollution Control in the
Wider Caribbean Region,” (1998) 7. http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/techreports/tr40en/index.html at 8 July
2003.
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risk of spills and pollution is high.62 Despite this recognition, little has been done to
determine the risks or prepare a response.63 Even basic monitoring responsibilities,
created under Cartagena´s oil spill protocol of 1983, are not being fulfilled.64

Article 8 of Cartagena deals with sea-bed exploitation. It can be assessed by examining
how the WCR has dealt with its main sea-bed resource, oil. As observed above, WCR
seems to have had little success in dealing with its oil pollution problems whether caused
by the industry itself or by ship related activities.

Article 10 requires the parties to create specially protected areas. CEP’s SPAW
programme has made some progress in terms of establishing Specially Protected Areas.65
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UNEP Assessment “Oil pollution has been identified as an important environmental issue in the WCR
and that due to the amount of oil tankers and frequency of navigation through out the region there is a big
risk that accidents happen. It is of paramount importance that flexible oil contingency plans be drafted to
deal with emergencies not only for crude oil but other harmful substances that can also be transported in the
region”, above n 49, 16.
63
UNEP Assessment above n 49, 11. Noted also by C. Roach, UNDP Caribbean Regional Seminar On The
Use Of Information Technology In Comprehensive Disaster Management “The Transport Dimension: A
Maritime Safety System” Ocho Rios, Jamaica 29 - 31 May 2002 slide 15
<http://www.cdera.org/pdfs/meetings/itconf2002/1_Disaster%20Preparedness%20Maritime%20Transport_
.pdf > at 18 July 2003.
64
The protocol on oil spills, the oldest of the three protocols, which among other things requires monitoring
and reporting of oil spills, may be of questionable value. In recent telephone interviews with officers of
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to the WCR for any period were not available. Telephone interviews conducted June 25 and 26, 2003.
Coincidentally, Mr. Fion Molloy of ITOPF’s London office is preparing a study on spills in excess of
5,000 tonnes in the Caribbean and has been kind enough to provide me with his statistics, which are
attached as Appendix I. Unfortunately, as ITOPF notes, its information is limited to tankers, combined
carriers and barges, and only to accidental spills and that 85% of spills are less than 7 tonnes. Given such
statistics and the limitations, one cannot but help to wonder what value such information really is in an
analysis of oil entering the Caribbean as a result of shipping. Furthermore, despite various estimates of
amounts of oil entering the marine environment, such as those noted by S. Patin, "Environmental Impact of
the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry" <http://www.offshore-environment.com/oilpollution.html> at June
30, 2003 relying on three different studies, the GESAMP acknowledges that it needs to determine a number
of variables before it can issue any authoritative numbers concerning oil entering the marine environment.
IMO/FAO/UNESCO-IOC/WMO/WHO/IAEA/UN/UNEP, Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects
of Marine Environmental Protection (GESAMP) “Report Of The Thirtieth Session” Monaco, 22–26 May
2000, Reports and Studies No. 69, p. 5. http://gesamp.imo.org/no69/index.htm at 5 July 2003 (hereinafter
UNEP Monaco)
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Over one hundred protected areas have been established in the WCR.66 Unfortunately,
many of the areas have no management plans.67 As noted in UNEP’s technical report on
the issue: “Institutions involved with protected areas are usually small, understaffed, and
under-trained.”68 Many of the parks created under SPAW are no more than “paper
parks.”69

Article 11 requires the development of contingency plans. This obligation was created in
1983. It has yet to occur.70 Other Article 11 obligations may be faring better. One notes,
for example, CEP’s report that it has provided information and coordination assistance in
some marine pollution incidents.71

Article 12 requires international consultation with respect to major development projects.
Despite major real estate developments pursuant to Mexico’s FONATUR72 and various
major port developments,73 no evidence of such consultations having occurred was
uncovered in the course of researching this paper.
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The basis for this part of the discussion is M. Miller, “Protecting the Marine Environment of the Wider
Caribbean Region: The Challenge of Institution-Building.” Green Globe Yearbook (1996) 37.
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Caribbean Environment Programme, United Nations Environment Programme, CEP Technical Report 36
“Status of Protected Area Systems in the Wider Caribbean Region” (1997) 3.
69
Miller, above n 60, 43.
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Roach, above n 58.
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Noted on CEP website http://www.cep.unep.org/search/map.html at July 3, 2003.
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Mexican government agency responsible for the development of major tourist destinations including
Cancun, and Cozumel.
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A CSX container port being built on the Caucedo Peninsula, Dominican Republic is to be ready this year,
2003 http://www.tdctrade.com/shippers/vol25_2/vol25_2_seaports02.htm at 3 July 2003, another national
port in Martinique for 2004, www.industriemartinique.com/industry.html and three more new ones reported
in Panama http://www.embassy-avenue.jp/panama/econo.htm at 3 July 2003.
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Article 13 requires sharing of scientific information. CEP’s series of 43 technical reports
goes some way in addressing this concern.74 And a general review of internet search
results indicates some cooperation among scientists and governments on environmental
issues.75 Article 14 requires the development of laws to address liability and
compensation in the event of pollution damage. To date, this has not occurred. In her
analysis of Cartagena’s oil spills protocol, seven years ago Miller observed: “Even in a
non-controversial areas such as the oil-spills Protocol, progress on implementation has
been slow… few of them [countries] have implementing legislation.”76

Article 15 requires institutional development and integration. Such development and
integration has not yet occurred to a significant extent.77 As Miller observed, “oil spills
response capability in the region is still very limited, and it is inhibited by legal and
administrative problems.”78

74

Studies available on CEP’s website. <http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/techreports/techreports.html> at 10
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In the overall, as to the actual condition of the environment, there is little evidence that
the situation today is different than it was twenty years ago when Cartagena was first
ratified.

6. WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?
Given the complexity of the political and economic situations and of pollution itself,
there are a number of causes which can be identified as causing or contributing to the
problem. The Global Action Plan meeting report identifies the following root causes:
poverty, unsustainable consumption patterns, and poorly managed social and economic
development.79

The region addressed by Cartagena would be characterized as having all four of the root
causes: poverty, unsustainable consumption patterns, and poorly managed social and
economic development. Poverty, places a great number of competing demands on
governments that themselves lack sufficient resources. Governments of developing
countries are dealing with such basic concerns as potable water, sanitary sewers, basic
education, and housing. Given these top priority items, it seems difficult to justify the
expenditures required to address environmental concerns80 such as expensive port
reception facilities81 or sewage treatment plants.
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“Report Of The First Intergovernmental Review Meeting On The Implementation of The Global
Programme Of Action For The Protection Of The Marine Environment From Land-Based Activities”
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Sewage as the main pollution concern in the WCR, deserves priority in terms of funding.
Nevertheless, given the costs it is hardly surprising that sewage treatment is not
improving. As noted in UNEP’s 2001 report concerning the WCR:
…serious and maybe expensive measures [to deal with sewage] should be taken
promptly. At present only very few governments are negotiating projects on
sewage management.82

The generous figure is as previously mentioned, between 80% and 90% of all waste is
discharged untreated into the near shore area of the Caribbean.83

This sewage treatment issue is exacerbated by the tourism industry. Tourism is a very
significant part of the economy of the WCR.84 On an annualized basis, these tourists add
some 700,000 tons of solid waste.85 Furthermore, tourism is often developed in areas
with insufficient municipal waste treatment facilities86 which situation is exacerbated by
cruise ship dumping.

Generated Waste In Many Ports” MEPC/Circ.309, 19 January 1995, T5/1.07 http://www.uscg.mil/hq/gm/nmc/imo/pdf/Circ0/Mepc1/309.pdf at 2 July 2003.
82
UNEP Assessment above n 49, 16.
83
UNEP Assessment above n 49, 11. SEE Lloyd Gardner, Ecotech Inc. Ltd, CEP Technical Report 38.
“Coastal Tourism in the Wider Caribbean Region: Impacts and Best Management Practices” (1997)
http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/techreports/tr38en/index.html at 15 July 2003.
84
It produced a very significant 25% of the GDP in 1996 it is expected to increase to 36% of the GDP by
2006. (UNEP: Assessment of Land-based Sources and Activities Affecting the Marine, Coastal and
Associated Freshwater Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region,” UNEP/GPA Co-ordination Office &
Caribbean Environment Programme (1999), 8.) The region’s 70 million inhabitants are increased annually
by some 35 million tourists with an average stay of 10 days. (This estimate does not include entire
countries, such as Mexico or Columbia, whose entire population is not on the Caribbean. It does include the
complete population of island countries. Source: UNEP Assessment above n 49, 1.) An additional 13.4
million tourists arrive on cruise ships. UNEP Assessment above n 49, 4, The Caribbean hosts 50% of the
world’s cruising tours 8. This number is conservative given the radically different figures offered by GEO
-3 “Tourism represents around 12 per cent of the GDP of the region, much of which is concentrated along
the coasts. Some 100 million tourists visit the Caribbean each year and contribute 43 per cent of GDP and
one third of export revenue.” Above n 53, 18.
85
UNEP Assessment above n 49, 11.
86
CEP Technical Report 33, above n 39, 7.

29

Poverty further exacerbates the problem by limiting environmentally friendly alternatives
for survival available to people suffering from poverty. Many poor people sustain
themselves by unsustainable consumption practices which result in such things as
deforestation, and fishery collapses.87 Unsustainable consumption patterns are also
manifest at the opposite end of the spectrum. USA’s consumerist culture is universally
recognized as very harmful to the environment. The impact on the WCR of USA
lifestyle can be seen in the level of contaminants in Mississippi River discharges into the
Gulf of Mexico88 where in 1997 it created a 7,000 square mile dead zone in the Gulf of
Mexico.89

Financing also effects governmental ability to treat pollution from oil extraction, refining
and transport. Financing problems inhibit a government’s ability to monitor oil
contamination by ships in its waters and accordingly, the number of discharges
discovered is minimal. None of the Latin governments has appropriate funds for such
monitoring.90 Further, governments lack funds for the notoriously expensive port
reception facilities.
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Financing problems extend to the RSP administration itself, which as part of UNEP, has
suffered from severe funding constraints. RSP noted in its 2001 report:
“The available biennial budget for the regional seas programmes had declined
drastically from a level of some $10 million to $12 million during the first half of
the 1990s, to a current level less than $3 million.”91

The WCR´s pollution problem also stems from failed efforts to manage economic
development. In particular, the need for foreign currency, brought in by industry, oil and
tourism create an overwhelming pressure to relax or ignore competing environmental
claims.92

Environmental law in Latin America is in considerable transition and reform.93
Currently, much environmental law is scattered through other pieces of legislation, and
developed on outmoded command-and-control models.94 Legislative efforts have not
been effectively coordinated and there are innumerable conflict of laws issues as new
legislation is laid over top of existing legislation.95 These problems combine to leave
many legislative gaps in terms of dealing with environmental problems.96
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Finally, at an institutional level there are considerable problems. The international
corruption watchdog, Transparency International, places all of the Latin countries
signatory to Cartagena among the bottom 50% corrupt countries.97 This failure, when
combined with the complex nature of the political situation—the WCR is made up of 36
states and territories with widely varying economies, levels of development, populations,
and access to resources—exacerbates the problems of coordination. The governments
themselves are weak and poorly organized.98 Finally, many writers and reports note the
lack of political will to deal with the issues.99

7. MEXICO: A COUNTRY SPECIFIC CASE STUDY OF THE
CARTAGENA CONVENTION
In many ways Mexico is typical of Latin American countries, including most of the
countries that have ratified Cartagena and may be therefore a good indicator of how
things transpire in the other countries that have ratified Cartagena. Mexico is the second
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largest economy in Latin America. Its population is approaching 100 million inhabitants
and it depends heavily on oil production and tourism for its economic strength. The
majority of both its oil and its tourism are located on and in the Caribbean.

Mexican environmental laws are reasonably stringent and comprehensive.100 Article 27
of the 1917 Constitution states that public interests must be considered in the exploitation
of natural resources. Environmental issues were not a serous consideration, however,
until Mexico began to industrialize in the 1950–60’s.101 In the late 1980’s and early
1990’s the Mexican government changed its view of natural resources in general, and the
environment in particular, from a public good in need of protection to an economic
resource. The result has been that environmental law is now created and subjected to a
cost-benefit analysis.102

Mexico has gone through turbulent economic times since 1973.103 There have been three
currency devaluations since that time, the last in 1994.104 Real average earnings declined
20% in the four years following the last devaluation.105 Given this difficult situation, it
can hardly be questioned but that “Mexico’s thirst for economic stability has led to the
relaxation of environmental enforcement.”106 In addition to such activities as dumping
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untreated toxic wastes directly into the Rio Grande,107 the river which marks Mexico’s
northern border with the United States and which empties into the Gulf of Mexico, 108
Mexico has courted foreign investment on the basis of relaxed environmental
enforcement.109

Mexico is a signatory to MARPOL 73/78, Annexes I and II, and to Cartagena. As a civil
law jurisdiction, these ratifications require no further legislation to become law. The
implementing legislation for these agreements, however, is not present.110 An effective
bureaucracy to administer the responsibilities has not been created. The efficacy of the
legal system is undermined by the internecine fighting between various governments and
a corrupt judiciary.111 Finally, Mexican law enforcement is less than consistent or
transparent, to say the least.112

After its conspiratorial view in the 1970’s that environmentalists were sponsored by
multinationals opposed to the development of poor nation, the government began to
develop a small bureaucracy to deal with the environment. The Mexican government
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impact studies, (apparently in response to the peso devaluation in the previous year) and in general, Joel
Simon, Mexcio en Riesgo, (1998) Mexico, Editorial Diana, pp. 223-257.
110
Although the Mexican federal environmental website acknowledges its commitments under UNCLOS
and MARPOL, curiously it does not refer to Cartagena. “About Us”
<http://www.profepa.gob.mx/seccion.asp?sec_id=169&com_id=0> at July 21, 2003.
111
Discussed generally in United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention “Judicial
Corruption in Developing Countries: Its Causes and Consequences,” March 2001, Vienna, CICP 14,
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first acknowledged the seriousness of the situation when President Ernesto Zedillo (19942000) appointed biologist, Julia Carabias, as chief of the Secretariat of Environment,
Natural Resources and Fisheries (SEMARNAP). Carabias observed: “we (inhabitants of
Mexico) have reached a critical point in terms of environmental degradation.”113 The
Mexican environmental agency states that the condition of the environment in Mexico is
no less than “apocalyptic.”114 The United Nations, for example, has declared the
mountainous regions of the State of Oaxaca the most eroded location on the planet.115
Exacerbating the seriousness of the situation is that this area is among the top 15 most
important areas on the planet in terms of biodiversity.116

More specifically, despite Mexico’s reliance on the marine environment, it has not been
able to protect it.117 Cancun, for example, an internationally renowned tourist
destination, is Mexico’s jewel on the Caribbean. It borders on the second largest coral
reef in the world, second only to Australia’s Great Barrier Reef.118 Cancun was
developed as an unpolluted, non-third world alternative to Mexico’s previously favoured
113
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destinations of Acapulco, Puerto Vallarta and Mazatlan. The Mexican government has
invested USD $3 billion in the development of Cancun since it started in 1969. Private
investors have invested an equal amount.119 Cancun has over 20,000 hotel rooms,
receives more than 1.5 million tourists annually, and accounts for one third of Mexico’s
USD $6.35 billion tourist income.120 Cancun provides 2.7 million jobs or 9% of the
active workforce.121

Today, Cancun’s lagoon smells of human wastes and its sewage flows untreated into the
Caribbean polluting beaches to the north as far as Puerto Juarez122 and killing the reefs
on which part of its tourist appeal relies.123 These environmental problems are starting to
drive tourists away from Cancun and further south along the Caribbean coast.124 The
writers of the UN WCMC Atlas describe Mexico’s Caribbean situation as follows:
Small reef patches, such as El Garrafon at Isla Mujeres and Punta Nizuc at
Cancun, have been completely destroyed by tourism and impacts are becoming
more evident elsewhere along the Cancun-Tulum touristic [sic] corridor, in places
such as Akumal and Puerto Morelos, as well as the offshore island of Cozumel.125
If this is occurring in the most important Caribbean location, within the jurisdiction of the
region’s second wealthiest Latin nation, it seems highly unlikely that much more is being
done to protect the marine environment by neighbouring, poorer states.
118
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As one of the WCR’s major oil producers, Mexico should have considerable facilities to
deal with oil pollution.126 In addition, Mexico is home to a number of major cruise ship
destinations. Yet none of its major WCR ports have adequate reception facilities.
Mexico also fails in its aerial surveillance of the WCR.

Finally, given Mexico’s weak and corrupt policing and judicial systems, it can hardly be
said that there is any meaningful enforcement of marine environmental law by Mexico.
Mexican environmental inspectors earn about $150 USD per month and it is known that
bribery is routine.127 Indeed, the Mexican government under the Fox administration has
recognized the problem of corruption among its environmental inspectors and has
developed specific strategies to address it;128 however, to date little has changed.

Mexico’s failure to successfully implement many aspects of Cartagena do not speak well
of the situation elsewhere in the WCR.129
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8. CONCLUSION
There are a number of conclusions which can be drawn from this brief study. First and
foremost, the current system of environmental protection is failing to protect adequately
the environment of the WCR. Countries need to address the issues blocking
implementation. Clearly, one important aspect will be finding some means of improving
political will, perhaps by a different incentive scheme.130 This problem is something that
must be addressed by the developing countries.

As well, a major reason for failure to protect the environment of the WCR from its two
most serious pollution threats, sewage and oil, is the lack of finances.131 The third
world’s problem with lack of finances was acknowledged and addressed at Rio. Agenda
21 of the Rio Convention committed the developed countries to contribute 0.7% of the
GNP to developing countries for sustainable development and Agenda 21
implementation. Unfortunately, the developed countries, with few exceptions,132 have
not followed through.133 And even if they had, the perception among poorer countries is
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38

that the 0.7% figure hardly demonstrates a serious commitment to environmental
protection.134

Given the USA´s position as the world’s largest economy and largest polluter, it has a
moral obligation to assist in financing pollution reduction and control activities. Its
current position as the lowest contributor of aid among developed nations is morally
reprehensible. The recent administrations have failed to step up to the challenge of being
world leaders in this most significant sense.

Further as, Michael Julian, chair of the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection
Committee, observes, users—and in particular oil companies which have the greatest
need for such facilities—should be paying should be paying for port reception
facilities.135 The current environmental degradation resulting from responsibility for
these costs being placed with impoverished Caribbean governments is inevitable if the
financing situation remains as it is. A disproportionate amount of environmental damage
is being done in poor countries to meet rich countries demand for cheap oil. 136

The problem of environmental degradation is not limited to the WCR. Nor has the
current international environmental legal regime succeeded to any significant extent in
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stopping or reversing environmental degradation.137 It may be that as various authors
have proposed that a whole new approach to environmental law making is needed. These
scholars suggest an international legal regime, such as an empowered WTO equivalent
which ignores sovereignty, create and enforce environmental legislation.138 This
interesting suggestion has yet to be taken very far.

Other suggestions could include negotiating treaties which address the financial issue and
the lack of political will at the outset bycommitting signatories specify and allocate a
percentage of GDP as a mandatory contribution for monitoring and enforcement. The
legislation would take effect the year after the current incumbent government’s term
expires. Such a term could be reviewable and alterable upon a five year period and a
majority basis. The lack of start up funds and the weakening commitment to programs
over the long term may be addressed by such a mechanism.

Another important modification to environmental treaties would be to grant standing to
interested parties in the jurisdiction of their choice. For example, given the conflicting
interests governments find themselves in with respect to economy versus environment,
granting standing to environmental groups to bring enforcement litigation in the courts of
their choice would certainly increase the power of such treaties. Individuals with such
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interests are much more likely to monitor and take enforcement measures when they are
given the power to litigate.

Finally, for effective enforcement, technical standards and specifications must be set and
published early on in the process. While the argument is made that treaties get bogged
down and die in the process of negotiating the details, non-contentious, minimal
standards could be set, again on a renegotiable basis on a five year time frame. Such an
approach would at least start the process. Information about potentially harmful activities
and proposed activities must be widely disbursed as soon as possible. This distribution of
information is critical if NGO’s are to be involved in the monitoring and enforcement
aspects. The current lack of standards and publication makes it difficult to know who is
doing what to the environment. The lack of enforcement permits polluters impunity.

Cartagena has not been the shining success it could have been. No country has fully
lived up to its environmental responsibilities. That strategy appears to be strategy of
most nations, which can only result in the tragedy of the commons warned about nearly
forty years ago.139
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APPENDIX I - MAJOR TANKER SPILLS OF OVER 5,000 TONNES
IN THE CARIBBEAN SINCE 1974
Vessel Name
ATLANTIC EMPRESS

Quantity spilled
(tonnes)
(Type)
287,000
CRUDE

EPIC
COLOCOTRONIS
BURMAH AGATE
SCORPIO
CYS DIGNITY
LSCO PETROCHEM

60,000

CRUDE

36,000
32,000
16,000
16,000

AEGEAN CAPTAIN

14,000

CRUDE
CRUDE
CRUDE
FUEL OIL
(cargo)
CRUDE

OSWEGO TARMAC

11,000

ALVENUS
PRINCESS ANNE
MARIE
MASTER MICHAEL

8,500
6,500

MEGA BORG
ARKAS

Country
LESSER
ANTILLES
LESSER
ANTILLES
USA
MEXICO
VENEZUELA
USA

Yea
Cause
r
1979 COLLISION
1975 FIRE/EXPLOSI
ON
1979 COLLISION
1976 GROUNDING
1979 GROUNDING
1976 GROUNDING

LESSER
ANTILLES
BITUMEN LESSER
ANTILLES
CRUDE
USA
CRUDE
CUBA

1979 COLLISION

Caribbean Sea

1979

5,700

FUEL OIL
(cargo)
CRUDE

USA

5,000

CRUDE

USA

1990 FIRE/EXPLOSI
ON
1982 COLLISION

6,000

1977 COLLISION
1984 GROUNDING
1980 GROUNDING
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